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The fundamental problem in the field of the economics of innovation is which economic subjects are the sources 
of radical innovations and high technological performances. The study here confronts this problem by develop-
ing a theoretical framework underpinned in the concept of purposeful system having a purpose of global leader-
ship, which endeavours to analyse the sources of General-Purpose Technologies (GPTs) in a Schumpeterian 
world of innovation-based competition. Through an inductive study based on some societies that in the history 
have generated technological and economic change (Roman and Britain Empire, and current USA), the analysis 
shows vital characteristics that can be the sources of changes in the techno-economic paradigm. In particular, 
purposeful country-systems with high economic military potential, supported by a strategy of high R&D expen-
ditures, and the objective of global leadership, winning international conflicts against other great powers (a very 
strong competition for the hegemony), tend to generate several inventions and radical innovations that are 
spread, in the long run, across wide geo-economic areas. It seems that the initial sources of GPTs (e.g. aqueduct, 
steam engine, jet aircraft, computer, etc.) are, de facto, associated with the global posture of great powers to 
achieve/sustain global leadership in intensive (effective and/or potential) international competitions, rather than 
warfare per se. This study refers to this nexus as leadership-driven innovation. International conflict is the con-
text that spurs the GPTs, which are driven by global leadership of critical societies, whereas initial military 
R&D, demand and procurement are important mechanisms underlying the process that induces emerging path-
breaking technologies. The vital linkages between observed facts can support a general socio-economic frame-
work of the sources of path-breaking innovations based on a leadership of main economic subjects that support 
innovative activity (mainly in communications and energy systems parallel to transportation technology) and the 
evolution and development of human societies.  
 
 
Keywords:  Technological Innovation; Technological Change; Technological Paradigms; General-Purpose 
Technologies; Economic Change; Systems Concepts; Conflict; War; Global leadership; Great 
Powers, Techno-Economic Paradigm, Radical Innovation.   
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“If economics wants to take technology seriously,  
economics will have to become a more historical discipline” 
 Wright (1997, p. 1565) 
Problem  
Ayres (1998) claims that economic growth is a consequence of technological innovations, es-
pecially radical innovations (cf. Rae, 1834). In the field of the economics of innovation it is 
important to understand the sources of technical change that support economic growth and the 
wealth of nations (Rae, 1834; Sahal, 1981; Dosi, 1988; Freeman and Soete, 1987; Dixon, 
1997; Silverberg and Soete, 1994; Freeman, 1994; Ruttan, 2001; Coccia, 2005b). In particu-
lar, the fundamental problem is to understand which countries, firms and other economic sub-
jects are most likely to be the sources of radical innovations (Colombo et al., 2014). The 
study here confronts this scientific issue by developing a conceptual framework of leadership-
driven innovation, which endeavours to analyse the sources of new techno-economic para-
digms, such as General-Purpose Technologies (GPTs)2. 
Some scholars have described several approaches to analyse the drivers of technological 
change (cf. Wright, 1997; Ruttan, 1997; 2006, pp. 8-14; Hall and Rosenberg, 2010).  Porter 
and Stern (2001) show a positive relationship between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita and innovative capacity of countries. Instead, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) discuss the 
process by which societies develop technologies that facilitate the substitution of relatively 
abundant (hence, cheap) factors of production for relatively scarce (hence, expensive) factors 
in the economic system: the hypothesis of induced innovation (cf. also Ruttan, 1997; 2001).  
In general, technological change is driven by several concomitant forces that may coexist in a 
specific geo-economic places and timespan (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010; Coccia, 2009; 2010; 
2012a, 2012; 2014, 2014a; 2014b; cf. also Seymour Lipset, 1959). However, the most impor-
                                                                    
2 See Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1996; Bresnahan, 2010. This paper analyses the origins of GPTs that generate long-run 
structural and social change. These path-breaking innovations are mainly of transformative nature, which by a “destructive 
creation” (Calvano, 2007) makes prior products and knowledge obsolete (Colombo et al., 2014). This study uses inter-
changeably the terms GPTs, disruptive technologies, radical innovations, revolutionary innovations, discontinuous innova-
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tant driving force of changes in the techno-economic paradigm and GPTs is a fundamental 
problem for the economics of technical change, which is not well understood. Ruttan (1997, 
p. 1524) argues that: “approaches to understanding the sources of technical change – induced 
technical change, evolutionary theory, and path dependence – is approaching a dead end. At-
tempts to construct bridges linking the separate approaches are now necessary to advance our 
understanding of the sources of technical change.”  
This study develops a socio-economic theoretical framework based on the systems concept of 
purposeful country-system with the aim of global leadership to analyse vital common charac-
teristics at the origins of path-breaking technologies and General-Purpose Technologies 
(GPTs), also called “Disruptive Technologies”. This study is part of a large research pro-
gramme à la Lakatos (1978) that aims to analyse the different sources of technological change 
to establish a comprehensive theoretical framework concerning the long-term development of 
new technology. The philosophy of science of this research is based on the position that there 
can be no adequate scientific knowledge where causes are unknown: “the cause of a phe-
nomenon is whatever adequately explains it, the whole ground, reason, or source of it” (G. 
Vico as quoted by Flint, 1884, p. 105ff). This inductive study is performed by an approach of 
scientific realism based on an historical case study research and empirical evidence (Thagard, 
1988, p. 145; cf. Kukla, 1998). The historical analyses constitute one main approach in the 
economics of innovation for supporting the development of a proper theoretical framework 
(David, 1985; 1997). In fact, Wright (1997, p. 1565) says: “if economics wants to take tech-
nology seriously, economics will have to become a more historical discipline”.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
tions, new techno-economic paradigms and changes in the techno-economic paradigm to indicate path-breaking innovations 
with a very strong impact on geo-economic systems (Coccia, 2005; 2005a).   
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Background and Conceptual Grounding  
General-Purpose Technologies (GPTs) are revolutionary changes from current technological 
trajectories (Bresnahan, 2010, pp. 763-791). GPTs are characterised by pervasiveness, inher-
ent potential for technical improvements, and ‘innovational complementarities’, giving rise to 
increasing returns-to-scale such as the steam engine, the electric motor, and semiconductors 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1996, p. 83, original emphasis, cf. also Lipsey et al., 2005; 
Bresnahan, 2010). These path-breaking innovations exert a pervasive impact across firms, in-
dustries and socio-economic systems. Main features of GPTs are a long-run period between 
their emergence and their impact on socio-economic systems (David, 1990; Lipsey et al., 
1998; Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2004). The economic models (e.g. induced technical 
change, evolutionary theory and path dependence) provide substantial insight concerning 
characteristics, properties and rates of technological change, but they do not address the 
sources of path-breaking technologies (cf. Ruttan, 2006). As a matter of fact, the understand-
ing of the sources of new techno-economic paradigms has not been accurately explored by 
economists of innovation (v. Tunzelmann et al. 2008, pp. 481-482; Teece, 2008, p. 510-511; 
Nelson, 2008, p. 496). Constant (1980, p. 15) advanced the concept of presumptive anomaly 
as sources of radical advances in technology: “presumptive anomaly occurs in technology . . . 
when assumptions derived from science indicate either under some future conditions the con-
ventional system will fail (or function badly) or that a radically different system will do a bet-
ter job” (cf. also Constant, 2000). However, a more comprehensive or general theory of the 
sources of GPTs does not yet exist (Ruttan, 2006). 
According to Lundvall (1992), technological innovation is generated by a profitable interac-
tion of elements within the national system of innovation3 (cf. also Soete et al., 2010; Nelson 
                                                                    
3  Lundvall (1992) states that the national system of innovation (NSI) refers to the complex network of agents, policies, and institutions sup-
porting the process of technical advancement in an economy. The narrow definition of NSI includes the sub-system of research sector rep-
resented by universities and research laboratories, while the broad NSI includes many sub-systems such as finance, firms, government, re-
search sector, and so on. 
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and Rosenberg, 1993). Soete et al. (2010, p. 1176) argue: “the notion of innovation systems 
points to a crucial role of history in contemporary economic performance, and the roots it has 
in innovation performance”. However, a fruitful “National System of Innovation” is a neces-
sary but not sufficient factor for supporting radical innovations and high technological per-
formances by specific countries over time.  
A vital role at the origin of path-breaking technological innovations (or “disruptive technolo-
gies”) can be played by socio-economic shocks, such as warfare (cf. Ruttan, 2001; 2006; 
Mowery, 2010). Although the war is a major agent of change (Stein and Russett, 1980, p. 
399), economists tend to exclude the war from theoretical explanations of phenomena and the 
war tends also to be a neglected explanatory variable in econometric modelling of innovation 
processes. Converse (1968, pp. 476-477) claims that: “for most . . . contributors once a war 
happens, it ceases to be interesting”. As a matter of fact, economists mainly dealt with eco-
nomic facts of a world “normally” at peace, whereas the relation between war and economic 
activity is mainly left to the historians (Mendershausen, 1943). 
War is an activity to produce security and ensure the nation against foreign enemies. When a 
country passes from peace to war, structural changes occur in society’s purposes and activities 
because international conflicts (wars and global wars in particular) influence negatively or 
positively some economic processes in a permanent way. A new main purpose of societies 
appears that of winning the war with vital socio-economic consequences (Mendershausen, 
1943). In the Ancient period, the victory was decided by the strength and prowess of popula-
tion, whereas the modern warfare depends more and more on drill, training, technical and en-
gineering knowledge, mechanical-electronic and information skills, cyberpower (Kramer et 
al., 2009), equipment and strategy, etc. Current international conflicts are won in research 
labs that generate high-teach weapons and systems (cf. Hirst, 1915, p. 3ff). In fact, economic 
analyses of the sources of technological change focused on peacetime economic activities can 
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be incomplete, and a better investigation of the war economy and mainly of war consequences 
can help to understand the general principles of the sources of technical change. In some stud-
ies of economics of innovation, social scientists have paid more attention to war’s effects on 
technology (Ruttan, 2001; 2006; Mowery, 2010). Neurath (1919) showed the stimulating ef-
fect of war on technical and organisational progress. War can support not only technological 
innovations but also other types of innovations: e.g. income tax in England, a model applied 
in every country, is originated during Napoleonic wars under the need of restructuring the fi-
nance of the government for military requirements, as well as in London the metropolitan po-
lice has the root in this period of wars due to the necessity of public security for lacking of 
troops (cf. Gini, 1920, p. 205). In the US, during the Secession war, was established the fed-
eral set of rule about banks, which is the basis of current system. Main innovative reforms and 
actions of public interest are carried out during the war due to overriding needs. Hence, schol-
ars can in-depth understand several socio-economic processes analysing the effects of wars 
and other forms of international conflicts (Stein and Russett, 1980, p. 400).  
Social scholars have also a theoretical reluctance to differentiate between types of warfare and 
there is a tendency to treat the war as a generic phenomenon with equivalent socio-economic 
impact, whereas some wars are more important than others in terms of socio-economic effects 
and distribution of international power. In fact, there is a differential impact of different types 
of war/conflict and there is a distinctiveness of global warfare’s impacts (Rasler and Thomp-
son, 1985). In particular, the global wars (a specific typology of international conflicts) gener-
ate several socio-economic consequences and long-term structural changes (Stein and Russett, 
1980, p. 401). Moreover, the effects of war on nation’s capability depend on characteristics of 
the war and vary across major and minor powers.  
A main role in international conflicts is played by leader countries (e.g. great powers) that 
have a high economic war potential based on a significant population (in terms of size, demo-
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graphic, occupational and political structure), substantial raw material resources at the dis-
posal, high technical level and economic organisation (Mendershausen, 1943, p. 8). In gen-
eral, leaders of international conflicts have a better military capability, technological and eco-
nomic superiority. Stein and Russett (1980) argue that the initial superior strength of some 
countries is provided by a superior military sophistication that can support the final victory.  
The theoretical significance of international conflicts (a wide set that also includes global 
wars) has been underappreciated in the analyses to detect the sources of GPTs (Smith, 1985). 
International conflicts and wars tend to create significant impacts on socio-economic systems 
and changes in the national wealth and rates of growth. Some scholars have pointed out the 
role of the demand side effects of wars that spur a huge demand shock to economic system 
due to a massive increase in deficit spending and expansionary policy (cf. Field, 2008); the 
standard interpretation couples the demand effect with a powerful supply shock - supply side 
effects -, resulting from learning by doing in military production, spin-offs and spillovers from 
military R&D. These two main factors are the basis for asserting a substantial positive effect 
of military conflicts on potential output and productivity growth of some countries (cf. Al-
chian, 1963; Gemery and Hogendorn, 1993; Ruttan, 2006; Baumol, 1986, p. 1073). Ruttan 
(1997, p. 1524) claims that a general theory to understand the sources of technical change 
should link the induced and demand factors. The war seems responsible for establishing main 
technological, economic and infrastructural preconditions for an “age of high mass consump-
tion” (Rostow, 1959, pp. 11-13). Wright (1997, p. 1565) examines the “American technologi-
cal leadership” and shows that the post-war economic structure of the United States is mainly 
based on five industries: aircraft, electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery, chemicals 
and allied products, and motor vehicles (cf. also David, 1977; Rosenberg, 1992, pp. 66-69). 
These driving manufacturing sectors for US economy have taken advantages from fruitful 
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demand- and supply-side effects of war, amplified by vital advances in electronics and infor-
mation technology. 
Wars influence profoundly economic systems across space and over time. In particular, large 
(or global) wars constitute severe shocks to the economies of participants and neutral nations 
(Goldstein, 2003, p. 215). Technological development often follows military necessity in war-
time. Governments can coordinate R&D investments to produce technologies for wars that 
can also be used for fruitful civilian technology in peacetime, such as the layouts of European 
railroad network were strongly influenced by military considerations, especially after Ger-
many used railroads effectively to overwhelm French Force over 1870-71 period, radar tech-
nology developed during World War II, the commercial diffusion over 1990s of the global 
positioning system (GPS) created for US military purpose, etc. (Goldstein, 2003).  
Wartime mobilisation leads to increased rate of inventions and technological innovations and, 
more importantly, to post war technological diffusion, both of which promote long-run eco-
nomic growth (Stein and Russett, 1980, p. 412). However, Field (2008) argues less fruitful 
perspectives concerning the effects of the war.  
Modelski (1972) claims that wars play a major role in the distribution of power in the interna-
tional system (cf. Levy, 1983; 2011). As a matter of facts, wars can fundamentally change the 
international system by affecting the number of actors in the system and their relative power 
(Modelski, 1972, p. 418). Moreover, Modelski (1972, p. 48) asserts that “war causes the Great 
Powers” (e.g. Roman Empire in the 30 BC – 500 AD, Britain Empire in the 1710-1850, the 
USA from 1940s onwards, etc.), which shape the global-political and economic system (Stein 
and Russett, 1980).  
Kindleberger (1989, p. 203) claims that:  
The Thirty Years’ War from 1618 to 1648, culminating in the economic dominance of the 
Netherlands, the French revolutionary, and Napoleonic wars from 1792 to 1815, ending in 
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Great Britain at the apex of the world economy, and the combined World Wars I and II, from 
1914 to 1945 that led to the United States taking over as the world’s leading economic power.  
Several nations have lost their status of great power or imperial leader as result of wars (e.g. 
Austria-Hungary in 1918; Italy in 1944; Germany and Japan in 1945; cf. Stein and Russett, 
1980). Major wars or large hegemonic wars among core countries produce changes in the 
global leadership of the world economy and “hegemonic cycles”, which are not regular and 
tend to be longer, in average, than 150 years (Kindleberger, 1989, p. 203ff; cf. Kennedy, 
1987, Cipolla, 1970; Olson, 1982).  
Hence, countries with a high economic military potential, winning an international conflict, 
can achieve and/or sustain a global leadership or hegemony on wide geo-economic areas. Lin-
stone (2007, p. 115) claims that: “the winner in each case became the leading global power, a 
new global political economy emerged, and democracy advanced” (cf. Devezas, 2006). The 
global leader tends to affect economic institutions and trade patterns of several geo-economic 
systems in subsequent peacetime and can support a social change of losers by a better social 
organisation of their institutions.  
Empire or Great power can be considered: “large-scale political organizations that might use-
fully be studied as complex systems. But they are also products of their age, and must be ex-
amined in the context of their time and place” (Modelski, 2010, p. 1418). In fact, leading na-
tions in the long run can also degenerate into functional inconsistencies and collapses such as 
the Roman Empire.  
Modelski (2010, p. 1419) argues that: 
Empires are not the only form of large-scale political organization…. two other forms, global lead-
ership (other terms used for it include hegemony – Greek for leadership – and global primacy), and . 
. .  global organization. . . . (Britain) is a case of global leadership that toward the close of its trajec-
tory exhibited imperial features. The United States, too, in relation to the world system, is an in-
stance of global leadership. And global leadership can be seen as a transitional form evolving in the 
direction of enhanced global organization. 
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Ferguson (2010) also considers the Empires or Global Leaders as complex systems, organised 
on a wide territory, that have a continuous behaviour of adaptation to turbulent environments 
(cf. Linstone, 2010; Devezas, 2010, p. 1412ff). Ferguson (2010) notes that after the World 
War II, the U.S. assume the role of global leadership, replacing U.K. and “shifting from an in-
formal to a formal empire much as late Victorian Britain once did” (as quoted by Modelski, 
2010, p. 1419)4. As a matter of fact, Ferguson (2010) considers the posture of the United 
States similar to an Empire with a military, political, economic and technological leadership 
worldwide recognised. Instead, Modelski (2010, pp. 1419-1420, original emphasis) claims 
that the USA is network-based and oriented to long-distance trade: “inclining at times to the 
temptations of ‘informal empire’ but in its basically non-imperial organisation capable of re-
sponding flexibly to international crises. . . .  its proper name is global leadership, an evolu-
tionary, and therefore transitional form capable of adaptation and self-transformation in re-
sponse to mounting global problems”. 
Current world is increasingly global, complex, turbulent, interconnected and multilevel, 
with wealthier countries than last two centuries, such that imperial aspirations are imprac-
ticable; the only feasible direction of countries with high economic potential is a global 
posture to achieve/sustain a leadership worldwide, reinforced over time with a higher 
economic and technological performances in comparison to other strong economic com-
petitors (cf. Modelski, 2010, p. 1419ff).  
This inductive study analyses, in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competi-
tion, the common characteristics and factors of the sources of GPTs governed by global 
posture to the leadership of some countries.  
Method and study design  
The study here considers the economic subjects (e.g. countries, firms, etc.) as complex 
                                                                    
4 cf. also Devezas and Modelski, 2003; Devezas, 2006; Ferguson, 2003. 
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systems, which by evolutionary processes of learning and adaptation, achieve specific 
purposes in a turbulent environment (cf. Modis, 2010; David and Rothwell,1996). The 
following fundamental systems concepts underpin the theoretical framework of this study.  
A purposeful system is one which can produce the same outcome in different ways in the same (in-
ternal or external) state and can produce different outcomes in the same and different states (Ack-
off, 1971, p. 666, original emphasis) 
The objective of a purposeful system in a particular situation is a preferred outcome that cannot be 
obtained within a specified period but which can be obtained over a long time period  
(Ackoff, 1971, p. 667, original emphasis) 
Adaptiveness is the ability of a system to modify itself or its environment when either has changed 
to the system’s disadvantage so as to regain at least some of its lost efficiency (Ackoff, 1971, p. 
668)….To learn is to increase one’s efficiency in the pursuit of a goal under unchanging condi-
tions (Ackoff, 1971, p. 669, original emphasis). 
 
In general, a leading country can be considered a purposeful system with several objectives: 
wealth, power, global leadership, comfort, national security or a combination of them. When 
one of this objective or multi-objective is achieved, institutions and, as a consequence, popu-
lation are interested in its maintenance and extension to support long-run progress of the na-
tion (Hirst, 1915).  
This study focuses on a specific typology of conflict, the international and major conflict5 that 
generates main structural change of economic systems; instead, normal conflicts/wars do not 
tend to produce social change and economic-wide effects.  
Some main concepts for underpinning the sources of new techno-economic paradigms are:  
Assumption 1 (context): International conflicts (such as global wars or challenges in “Big Sci-
ence”) are intensive competitions (military and not military) across great pow-
ers to achieve/sustain the global leadership and affect wide geo-economic ar-
eas.  
 
Assumption 2: International conflicts cause a strong social impact and economy-wide effects 
in the long run.  
Assumption 3 (global leadership): A purposeful country-system  is a complex system with 
high economic war potential, significant capability and purposeful elements 
that have the common purpose of global leadership. 
                                                                    
5 Pay particular attention that conflicts may be military and not military ones.  
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Assumption 4 (mechanisms): A purposeful country-system  implements evolutionary proc-
esses of learning and adaptation based on high military R&D (strategy ) to 
achieve/sustain the global leadership by winning international conflicts. 
 
The hypothetical approach is based on the following hypothesis α (HPα), which this study in-
tends to validate. 
 Hypothesis α (HP α) of leadership-driven innovation: A purposeful country-
system , implementing strategies of learning and adaptation  to win interna-
tional conflicts and achieve the global leadership, is a driving force of radical 
technologies, GPTs or new techno-economic paradigms that are diffused in 
the long run on wide geo-economic areas. 
The purpose of the present study is to ascertain whether the inductive approach, based on his-
torical and statistical evidence, supports the hypothesis HPα. 
Historical and statistical approaches 
In order to validate the HPα, main purposeful systems  with global leadership achieved by 
winning international conflicts against other hegemonic powers are analysed. This study fo-
cuses on global leaderships that have played a critical role in the worldwide technological 
progress and economic change: Roman and British Empire, and the USA.  
In particular,  
 For Roman Empire 1, the study considers the period from 214 Before Christ (B. C.) on-
wards, when Rome begins the conquest of the Mediterranean Sea Area and Europe.  
 For British Empire 2, the study considers the period from Seven Years’ War and Global 
conflict with France to achieve the hegemony.  
 For the USA 3, the study considers the period from 1940s onwards when, after the vic-
tory of World War II, the US have been playing a leading role worldwide.  
The timespan is equal to 74 years for these global leaders:  
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- for Roman Empire is from 214 to 140 B. C.  
- for British Empire is from 1756 to 1830 
- for the USA, 1940-2014 period 
The study analyses these leading societies  by some steps. 
1. The posture of global leadership of these purposeful systems  is detected by analysing 
some key documents and studies. The purpose of powerful country-systems is to achieve 
the global leadership to take advantage of important territorial opportunities and/or to 
cope with consequential environmental threats. The global posture and purpose of the 
purposeful system  for achieving the world-wide leadership is detected considering the 
number of wars performed over a fixed period of time. This modus operandi of engaging 
international conflicts and/or wars can yield, by victories, a fruitful global leadership on 
wide geo-economic areas. The incumbent global leadership needs to be sustained over 
time in the presence of threats by other belligerent systems.  
2. The connection between global leadership and origins of new techno-economic para-
digms. This study analyses briefly the origins of some path-breaking technological inno-
vations and General-Purpose Technologies (GPTs) within these societies  with global 
leadership. In particular:  
 roads, aqueducts and water mills for the Roman Empire; 
 steam engine in the British Empire; 
 jet aircraft, computer and internet for the US Global leadership.  
These main new techno-economic paradigms generate a platform and infrastructure for 
supporting clusters of innovations and new technological trajectories. These GPTs induce 
huge advances in communications and energy systems that are parallel to development in 
transportation technologies with a very strong impact on wide geo-economic areas 
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(David, 1969; Soete, 2001; 2006; Coccia, 2005, p. 123; 2005a). 
 
3. Mechanisms underlying the origins of GPTs governed by global leader to achieve/sustain 
the global leadership. The analysis of the strategy  of the system  for sustaining the 
global leadership can be measured and assessed by the levels of military expenditure as 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)6 in comparison to other main geo-political 
systems. The military R&D is important to support bases, active-duty personnel, operat-
ing costs, new military technology and other military activity to cope with (effective 
and/or potential) conflicts. The metrics based on military expenditures as % of GDP, of 
course, is applied only in the case of the USA, whereas for Roman Empire some reliable 
conjectures about the main role of military expenditures are based on historical  facts 
concerning the total army forces (estimated), instead for British Empire information 
about the level of military R&D are deducted by number of soldiers and naval fleet of 
Royal Navy during key wartime.  
4. High technological performance to support global leadership. In order to show that 
global leaders have also high technological performances in peacetime to support this in-
cumbent role, the analysis of commercial technological outputs is performed by patents. 
Patents are the most common metrics of innovative outputs to analyse technological out-
puts of advanced societies (cf. Steil et al., 2002, pp. 3-22; Coccia, 2010; Moser, 2013). In 
fact, innovations are protected by patents, which can indicate the current innovations of 
countries and also commercially promising inventions (cf. Coccia, 2010; Kortum, 1997). 
According to Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2011, p. 32): “the purpose of studying patents 
is to gain insight into technological progress, a driver of productivity growth, and ulti-
mately economic growth”. This study uses as source of patents and other technological 
indicators, such as R&D intensity, data by World Bank (2008) for US case study. In par-
 
 
15
ticular, the statistical analysis shows main trends and arithmetic means of innovative 
structural indicators. The rates of growth of US patents in comparison to other geo-
economic systems are computed by the exponential model of patent development:  
rt
t ePP 0  where e is the base of natural logarithm (2.71828…) 
t rt e
P
P 
0
;  tr
P
P
Log t 
0
; .
t
P
P
Log
r
t 



 0     [1] 
where :  
1: aP is patent applications of resident per million people at 1985 in the USA and High 
income OECD Countries7 
2: tP is patent applications of resident per million people at 2005 in the USA and High 
income OECD Countries 
3: t = 20 years 
4: Political economy of R&D over Forecast horizon ]t+n onwards[ (e.g. from 2005 
onwards) is similar to [t; t+n], i.e. [1985. . .  2005] (period of available data). 
Patents, as metrics of technological innovation, are applied only for assessing the commercial 
technological development of the USA, whereas for Roman Empire, this study performs some 
conjectures concerning inventions and innovations based on historical facts and studies. In-
stead, for British Empire, this study considers some results of historical researches based on 
patents of England during the Industrial Revolution by Bottomley (2007).  
The inductive study, based on a case study research, endeavours to detect common character-
istics and regularity at the origin of new techno-economic paradigms to lay the foundations 
for a theoretical framework concerning the sources of new techno-economic paradigms.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
6 The gross domestic product (GDP)—the value of all goods and services produced minus the value of any goods or services used in their 
creation—is the most common metrics applied in socioeconomic studies to measure the economic activity and wealth of nations. 
7 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  Countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States.  
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Figure 1. Flowchart from Global Leadership to the Origins of GPTs: Linkages and positive 
feedback effects of innovation process governed by purposeful systems  for supporting 
global leadership and high technological and economic performances. Note: key boxes are in 
grey and dotted line.  
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In short, the study tends to support the hypothesis HP α that GPTs are associated with the role 
of country-systems , with high economic war potential and technological capability (e.g. 
Roman and British Empire, and the USA), to achieve/sustain a global leadership in turbulent 
environment. Figure 1 shows the linkages that underpin the conceptual framework, which en-
deavours to explain the sources of GPTs and high technological performances by country-
systems  with global leadership. 
Evidence 
 Global posture to the leadership  
- Roman Empire: a global leader of the Ancient period  
The global posture of the Roman Empire, from several historical documents, is based on an 
attitude of Roman Emperors and Senate to achieve the domination of Mediterranean Sea geo-
economic area and Europe. The Latin phrase Imperium sine fine (“Empire without end”) ex-
pressed the ideology by Roman society that neither time nor space limited the Roman Empire 
(cf. Nicolet, 1991). The history shows that the global leadership by Rome established, roughly 
over 27BC-293AD, one of the largest Empire in history, with territories throughout Europe, 
North Africa, and the Middle East (Kelly, 2006).  
- British Empire and the global leadership  
The posture of the Kingdom of Great British to achieve the global leadership from 1710s 
can be detected by the high number of declarations of wars by George I, II, III; in particu-
lar 1718, 1739, 1762 and 1779 (against Spain); 1744, 1756, 1778 and 1803 (against 
France); 1780 (against Dutch Republic). The purpose was mainly commercial by acquir-
ing foreign territories that were rich sources of raw materials in order to support and pro-
vide markets for British manufactures, increasing the exportations according to mercantil-
ism theory (Canny, 1998; Ferguson, 2003; Abernethy, 2000; The Governance of Britain, 
2007). 
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- The United States of America and the ongoing global leadership  
Kindleberger (1989) argues that the USA, winning the World Wars I and II, over 1914-
1945, have achieved the world’s leading economic power and a global leadership world-
wide recognised (cf. also Wright, 1943). Davis et al. (2012, p. 7) show the list of US en-
during interests to sustain the global leadership such as: protect U.S. allies and partners 
from state adversaries;  promote U.S. influence in key regions; respond to regional con-
flicts and ensure the flow of commerce and key resources.    
 To achieve and sustain global leadership by engaging and winning international conflicts  
The modus operandi of the purposeful systems in the case study research for achieving and 
sustaining the global leadership is based on a proactive role to engage international conflicts. 
In order to support the HPα by critical evidence, Table 1 shows that the USA have engaged 
about 67 international conflicts over 1940-2014, whereas Roman Empire roughly 63 over 
214-140B.C, British Empire 71 over 1756-1830. The global posture of these purposeful sys-
tems  is prone to engage international conflicts, obtaining in the majority of cases victories 
that support the global leadership on wide geo-economic areas (see Table 2). 
Table 1. Total years of international military conflicts for Roman and British Empire and the 
USA to achieve the global leadership 
Roman Empire  
over 214-140BC  
(Before Christ) 
British Empire  
over 1756 to 1830 The USA over 1940-2014 
YEARS 
B.C.  
for Rome 
Total years 
 in which 
Rome  
engaged 
wars* % 
YEARS 
for the Great 
Britain  
Total years  
in which the 
Great Britain 
engaged wars % 
YEARS 
for the 
US 
Total years  
in which 
the US en-
gaged 
wars§ % 
214-140 63 84% 1756 to 1830 71 94.7% 1940 -2014 67 89% 
Source: * (Liddell, 1864);  § (Whiteclay Chambers, 1999; Allison et al. 2012; United States Senate, 2014). 
 (Laycock, 2012; Canny, 1998). The data may change according to historical sources analysed.  
Note: this study considers a specific period of 74 years in which the great power has a clear posture to 
achieve/sustain the global leadership.  
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Table 2. Results of some international conflicts for Roman and British Empire, and 
The USA to achieve and sustain global leadership 
Roman Empire over 214-140B.C. * British Empire over 1756 to 1830 The USA over 1940-2014 § 
Results 
Battles N. % 
Results 
Wars N. % Results Wars N. % 
Victories 88 62.41 
Net  
Victories 
10 
28,57 Victories 23 53.49 
Defeat 27 19.15 Net Defeat 4 11,43 Ceasefire 3 6.98 
Undetermined 27 19.15 Treaty 18
(1)
51,43 Withdraw 4 9.30 
-   Stalemate 1 2,86 Agreement 1 2.33 
   Peace 1 2,86 Undetermined 4 9.30 
   Conventions 1 2,86 Ongoing 8 18.60 
  100%   100   100% 
Note: The results are approximately because can change according to historical sources analysed.  
In the past the wars were mainly performed by battles (pitched battle and/or naval combat). Now the strategy 
of warfare is changed due to new technology and based on naval, aircraft and missile attacks. Source: * (Cassio 
Dione, 1823); § (Allison et al., 2012; Whiteclay Chambers, 1999);  (Laycock, 2012; Canny, 1998). (1) The 
Kingdom of Great Britain, after wars, agrees several Treaties in which acquired several territories due to the 
positive results of military conflicts (significant number of victories). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Western and Eastern Roman Empire (in red/orange colour) in the about 120  
(cf. Liddel, 1864). Source: Utah State University -http://www.usu.edu/ by Damen 2013- accessed De-
cember 2013 (http://www.usu.edu/markdamen/1320Hist&Civ/chapters/08ROMFAL.htm)  
 
Figure 2 shows a map of Provinces by Roman Empire and some reigns affected by Rome in 
the year 117. This figure 2 confirms the global leadership by Rome in the Ancient period, un-
derpinned in a strong military, economic  and political power, achieved and sustained by en-
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gaging and winning several international conflicts over time. Figure 3 shows that posture of 
global leadership by British Empire with several geo-economic areas controlled over time.  
 
Figure 3. Geo-economic areas controlled by the British Empire over time. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_British_Empire.png (accessed December 2014) Composed from maps 
found in:  Brown (1998); Nigel (2006) 
 
 
Figure 4. US Global leadership: military installations (in red/dark colour)  
Source: U.S. DoD (2003) 
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Figure 4 displays a map of geographical areas where there are US installations8 to sustain the 
ongoing global leadership. In particular, US Department of Defense (DoD) has about 700 for-
eign installations in more than 60 countries worldwide (DoD, 2003). Davis et al. (2012) 
claim: 
Since World War II, the United States has relied on a network of global military bases and forces 
to provide forward, collective defense against the Soviet Union, to counter the proliferation of 
weapons of mass  destruction, and to fight terrorism (p. xiii) . . . .  
The current U.S. overseas military is largely the outcome of responses to threats as they emerged 
historically and over time, in Western Europe and in East Asia to the Soviet Union . . . .  the So-
viet Union has transitioned from a peer competitor to something less, while China’s economic 
standing and military capabilities allow it increasingly to challenge U.S. global leadership (p. 1).  
 
The high presence of US military installations in figure 4 shows the geo-political world-wide 
influence by US global leadership, achieved and sustained after World War II.  
 The strong connection between Global Leadership of Great Powers and new techno-
economic paradigms  
The strategy and modus operandi of purposeful systems  with global leadership seem to be a 
main driver of technological change. Some main GPTs originated by global leadership socie-
ties are as follows.  
- GPTs by Roman society (Roads, Aqueducts and Water Mills) 
The Roman Empire during its global leadership has originated and diffused vital GPTs in en-
gineering and construction technology (e.g. roads, aqueducts, the use of bricks in construction 
technique, etc.) as well as water mills for the production of energy and the substitution of la-
bour (Singer et al., 1956). Rae (1834[1905], p. 168) argues: “The mechanical part of architec-
ture underwent a revolution among the nations that were finally consolidated into the Roman 
Empire, by the adoption of the arch, and the employment of cement. The Egyptians and Gre-
cians were stonecutters; the romans, masons”. 
The incentive to support main innovations was mainly driven by military objectives. In fact, 
the Romans primarily built roads for their military purposes to enhance transportation of stra-
                                                                    
8 Installation: “A military base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the 
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tegic materials and communications in the Empire. These GPTs (roads, bridges, etc.) have 
probably also a significant economic importance, though wagon traffic was often banned from 
the roads and bridges to preserve their strategic military value (Singer et al., 1956, Ch. 14, 
vol. 2). These main GPTs, subsequently, in the long run, were also used for commercial ac-
tivities.  
The Romans also constructed numerous aqueducts (a vital GPTs in the advances of ancient 
societies) to supply water in several colonies. Roman aqueducts were built to remarkably fine 
tolerances and to a high technological standard. These main GPTs supported an efficient so-
cial organisation and development of Rome (Singer et al., 1956, vol. 1). Moreover, the global 
posture and leadership by Roman Empire spread these GPTs across wide geo-economic areas, 
such as Spain, France, etc.  
These GPTs created a platform that has spurred clusters of technological innovations. For in-
stance, the mill was known at the time of Julius Caesar in Rome and the wide diffusion of this 
path-breaking innovation across the wide territory of the Roman Empire was supported by 
GPTs of the aqueducts, infrastructures that transported large amounts of water very efficiently 
(cf. Forbes, 1955-56). These vital new techno-economic paradigms (aqueducts and water 
mills) supply hydro-mechanical energy for the economy of the Roman Empire (Greene, 2000; 
Singer et al., 1956). In fact, GPTs of the water mill were a means of employing the power of 
the water in the operation of grinding and other main economic activities, supporting the pro-
gress of the Roman society (Rae, 1834[1905] p. 178-179). Hence, global leadership by Rome 
generates and spreads vital GPTs that are main socio-economic platforms for supporting new 
technological trajectories and, as a consequence, the technological and economic progress of 
the Ancient world in wide geo-economic areas (cf. Rosenberg, 1992).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Department of Defense, including leased space, that is controlled by, or primarily supports DoD’s activities” (U. S. DoD, 2003). 
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- GPTs during Great Britain global leadership (Steam engine) 
Napoleonic wars from 1792 to 1815 (a main global war for the hegemony) led to the global 
leadership of the Great Britain (the British Empire), which subsequently affects the world 
economy. In fact, during this historical period of the British global leadership, Industrial 
Revolution is originated in England, driven by the GPTs of the steam engine and other radical 
innovations (cf. Rae, 1834). Ruttan (2006a, p. 3-4) argues that: “knowledge acquired in mak-
ing weapons played an important role in the industrial revolution”. These changes in the 
techno-economic paradigm during the global leadership of England are driven by steam en-
gine and rapidly diffused towards other European countries and North America (now Canada 
and the USA), generating a huge economic and employment growth in several industries 
(Rae, 1834; Mokyr, 2010; cf. Novolari et al., 2011).  
- GPTs during U.S. global leadership (Jet Aircraft, Computer and Internet) 
Modelski (2010, p. 1419) claims that: “It is widely recognized that in the 20th century, 
spurred by two world wars, the United States stepped into the role previously occupied by 
Britain”. In fact, the United States, as ongoing global leader, are playing  a predominant role 
in initiating or implementing new General-Purpose Technologies (GPTs) that have emerged 
from military and defense R&D, such as jet aircraft, computer, semiconductor, satellites, tele-
communications technology, etc.  
Ruttan (2006) and Mowery (2010) show that US military sector has supported the develop-
ment of jet aircraft as a main new technology to have the pre-emption during international 
conflicts. In addition, intensive military procurement, subsequently, has improved the jet air-
craft technology and supported the commercial development of groundbreaking products in 
the civilian aviation industry, such as Boing 707 and 747. 
The first calculator was a military order by a US missile laboratory. The Korean War and 
Cold War against Russia have played a main role to develop the computer by IBM as a fully 
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transistorised commercial computer. Now these GPTs are generating a huge structural change 
across all industries and socio-economic systems (cf. Sahal, 1981; Ruttan, 2006; Mowery, 
2010).  
The development of internet has its origin in a computer network initially established in the 
1960s with an advanced research projects agency (ARPA) by Defence department for having 
a strategic technology of telecommunications during the Cold war against Russia. The suc-
cessful demonstration at the 1st international conference on computer communications held in 
October 1972 at Washington D. C. spurred the possible convergence of computer and tele-
communications industries. Now the impressive effects of these GPTs are well known (cf. 
Devezas et al., 2005).  
 
These GPTs, originated to support global leadership in military settings, have had a pervasive 
diffusion in the peacetime and stable economies by exerting a very strong impact on world-
wide growth of socio-economic systems with a “creative” substitution from old to new tech-
nology.  
 
In particular global leadership tends to support the origin and pervasive diffusion of GPTs and 
new techno-economic paradigms with very strong long-run impact on wide geo-economic 
systems (cf. Soete, 1985; 2001). This inductive study seems to show a fruitful nexus from 
global leadership, underpinned in the high military R&D and economic war potential, to de-
velopment of new path-breaking technology: leadership-driven Innovation.  
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 Mechanisms underlying the purpose of achieving/sustaining global leadership that sup-
port the sources of GPTs: Military expenses and investments  
The strategy  to achieve and sustain the global leadership by the purposeful system  is un-
derpinned in higher military research and expenditures to be more efficient in (effective 
and/or potential) international conflicts.  
- For Roman Empire there are not reliable data about military research and expenditures.  
However, some historical documents confirm the high investments in human resources and 
military technology by Rome during several wars (Hugh, 1996; Grant, 1993). In fact, Ro-
man society gave particular attention to the role of military technology in order to sustain 
the worldwide supremacy (e.g. some Roman military innovations such as ballista, gladius -
short sword of the Roman army- provided critical strategic and tactical advantages during 
the continuous warfare-cf. Vegezio, 2001; Cassio Dione, 1823; Tito Livio, 2003; Urso, 
2013).  
 
Table 3.  Roman Army 24–337BC 
Roman  
Emperors Tiberio Traiano Adriano 
Marco 
Aurelio 
Settimio 
Severo 
Aureliano
Military 
Anarchy 
Diocleziano Costantino I 
Period AD 24 107 ca. 135 166/7 211 275 305 337 
Total  
Roman  
Force 
(units) 
  
300.000 454.000 443.000 454.000 502.000 524.000 584/599.500 645.000~ 
Other  
estimates * 255.000  383.000  442.000  390.000 410.000 
Source: *Hassal (2000), MacMullen (1979), Elton (1996). 
 
A main proxy of huge military investments for supporting Roman leadership can be de-
tected by estimates of Roman Army forces per each Emperor (see Table 3; cf. also Jones, 
1986; Webster, 1998; Goldsworthy, 2000). 
- For the Kingdom of Great Britain is difficult to find data about military expenditures, but 
some deductions of historical facts can provide a proxy of the main role of military in-
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vestments (tab. 4). In particular, the military investments of the British Empire can be de-
tected in the naval force. The Royal Navy grew from 173 ships (about 100,000tons) in 
1688 to 755 ships (more than 500,000tons) in sea service in 1809 (Williamson, 2002; cf. 
Duffy, 1980; 1992). Moreover the Royal Navy heavily invested in the establishment of na-
val bases overseas. Another main factor that shows the high military investment by Britain 
to support the leadership is the expansion of war manpower in tab. 5. 
 
Table 4.  British Army over 1700s-1780s 
Period of war Troops 
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) 
 
In 1702, England has less than 20,000 soldiers (Paget, 
1977; cf. Black, 1999), but this number is expanded 
greatly to support the war effort. Parliament approved 
enough funding to support 50,000 troops by 1706 and 
75,000 by 1711 (Scouller, 1966). 
Seven Years’ War in 1762 The number of troops on British pay had peaked near 
the end of the Seven Years War, at about 230,000 in-
cluding German mercenaries. The war had caused 
Britain great economic hardship, and these in turn 
brought drastic cutbacks to the Army. 
The rebellion in the North American colonies, where 
an estimated 450,000 men were capable of fighting 
(250,000 different men were enlisted at one point or 
another for the American side) (cf. Barnett, 1970; 
Rogers, 1977). 
The War of American Independence (1775-83) 
 
Table 5.  War establishment manpower by British Royal Navy   
Period of war War establishment manpower 
War of Austrian succession 1748 44,861 
Seven Years’ War in 1762 84,797 
American war of Independence in 1783 107,446 
Napoleonic Wars in 1810 142,098 
Source: Williamson (2002) 
 
- The USA. Figure 5 shows the trend of higher US investment in military expenditure as per-
centage of GDP in comparison with other leading countries (e.g. Russia, France, and 
China). Data confirm that the U.S. have high military and defence expenditures in order to 
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sustain the economic war potential and global leadership for effective and/or potential in-
ternational conflicts.  
 
Figure 5. Military expenditures of some leading countries. Source: Elaboration on data by SIPRI 
Military Expenditure Database (2014) 
 
 High economic and technological performance governed by the global leaders to sustain 
global leadership over time. 
- Roman Empire. It is clearly difficult or impossible to give an exhaustive run down of 
all ancient technologies originated in Roman history. The measurement and evaluation of 
commercial technology development in the Roman Empire based on the count of the num-
ber of main inventions and innovations does not provide reliable results; however, several 
historical studies confirm the huge number of discoveries, inventions and innovations by 
Roman Empire in comparison to other contemporary societies of the Ancient economy 
(Forbes, 1955-56; Singer et al. 1956; Hodges, 1970; Landels, 1978; White, 1984; Greene, 
2000; Wilson, 2002). Some innovations are in construction and architectural technology 
(e.g. cement, bridge, aqueducts, etc.), agriculture, surgical instruments, food technology, 
hydraulic technology, etc. (Greene, 2000). The fruitful technological change by Roman 
Society was due to high geographical concentration in specific locations of human capital, 
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technical knowledge, production and dense social networks. The economic activity in the 
Roman Empire was focused on the generation of state-of-the-art products in military and 
civil settings for an advanced society in Ancient period (Singer et al., 1956). Moreover, the 
growth of Roman technological advances was relatively great in the two centuries B.C., in 
coincidence with some main historical events that sustained the hegemony and global lead-
ership (cf. Kelly, 2006; Nicolet, 1991): the period of the Roman Republic (i.e. better eco-
nomic governance); Greece was controlled and Rome had a greater access to new knowl-
edge ; high incentive during the intensive warfare and military victory over Carthage (a 
rich and potent city of North Africa and belligerent great power for the supremacy of 
Mediterranean Sea geo-economic area); instead, Roman technological advance was rela-
tively slower from the 1st Century AD onwards due to the beginning of the decline of the 
Empire and of the global leadership (cf. Cipolla, 1970; Ferguson, 2003, 2010). These his-
torical facts seem to show that a global posture to achieve and sustain a global leadership 
can support and accelerate technological pathways and the generation of groundbreaking 
commercial products for societies.  
- British Empire. The acceleration of patents for commercial products in the British Empire, 
is showed in Figure 6 (Mokyr, 2009; Clark, 2014).  In fact, analysis of British patents over 
1700-1851 by Bottomley (2007) shows higher technological performances of England, as 
global leader, in comparison to Scotland and Ireland. This result is due to a powerful Eng-
lish economic system to support the worldwide leadership, whereas Scotland and Ireland 
did not have any purpose of global hegemony. These fruitful innovative outputs by Eng-
land during its global leadership are confirmed by Clark (2014).  
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Figure 6. British Patents, 1770-1851. Source: Bottomley (2007), p. 15 
- The USA. Table 6 shows main indicators of US technological development in comparison 
to other countries. The USA have average military expenditure as percentage of gross do-
mestic product (GDP), R&D intensity, patens applications and GDP per capita higher than 
other leading countries (Table 6).  
Table 6. Technological and economic performances across leading countries 
Countries 
Average  
Military  
expenditure  
as % of GDP 
 
 
1992-2013* 
Average R&D 
expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
 
 
 
1996-2005 
Average Patent 
applications, 
residents per 
million 
People 
 
1985-2005 
Average GDP 
per capita, PPP 
(constant 2005 
international $)  
 
 
1989-2006 
Average GDP 
per capita 
growth 
(annual %) 
 
 
1990-2006 
United States 3.90 2.66 447.20 36,318.11 1.77 
Russia  3.87 1.09 145.84 9828.36 0.13 
France 2.64 2.18 224.04 27,439.67 1.43 
UK 2.60 1.82 334.51 26,565.94 2.03 
China P. R. 1.99 0.92 18.00 2,398.01 8.79 
Note: * SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014);  World Bank (2008). In bold high performances.  
 
These US higher performances, associated with several socio-economic factors, tend to 
generate a fruitful technological and economic development worldwide (cf. Faberberg et 
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al., 2010; Coccia, 2010, 2014a, 2014b). As a matter of facts, the economic and techno-
logical forces of strong performances seem to be associated with the incentive of the 
USA to sustain the ongoing global leadership. 
Considering the model [1] in methodology, table 7 shows the exponential growth rate r% of 
patent applications by U.S. in comparison to High Income OECD countries.  
Table 7. Exponential rate of growth of patent applications per million people across geo-
economic areas  
 
 
 
According to this model, the USA as ongoing global leader tends to have a high growth rate 
of patent applications (innovative output) in comparison to High Income OECD countries. 
This acceleration of US economy and technological performances (tab. 6-7) seems to be 
rooted in the US global posture to sustain the global leadership with a higher technological 
and economic superiority worldwide.  
 
In short, the results tend to show that countries with global leadership are associated with 
higher technological performances, driven by main GPTs originated to support this leadership 
in competitive settings: the inductive study seems to support the hypothesis α of leadership-
driven innovation.  
General Discussion  
Global leadership tends to generate high technological performances and, in specific circum-
stances, revolutionary and disruptive innovations. This result is grounded in the large theory 
of the incentives to innovate in competitive settings (Bénabou and Tirole, 1996; Calvano, 
2007). The global leadership of Rome has generated GPTs in engineering and construction 
Exponential rate 
based on model [1] 
Global leader 
United States 
High Income 
OECD countries 
r %° 44.68 21.62 
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technology, England as global leader has caused the Industrial Revolution based on steam en-
gine technology, whereas the global leadership by the USA has originated Telecommunica-
tions Revolution. 
Hence, new techno-economic paradigms tend to be originated by great powers during interna-
tional conflicts to achieve/sustain the global leadership and diffused in the long-run on wide 
and stable geo-economic systems. These common characteristics at the origins of GPTs seem 
to show some historical regularity: the origins of path-breaking technologies in international 
conflicts and subsequently diffusion are associated with the purpose of achieving/sustaining 
the global leadership by great powers, rather than warfare per se.  
Figure 7 shows some main GPTs originated during global leadership of great powers that 
have generated the evolution of social systems and human development. The duration from 
the start to the decline of a global leadership (in general a lung-run period) can be defined as a 
“cycle” that tends to induce changes in the techno-economic paradigm and also likely (irregu-
lar) K-waves  
 Global leadership
 Roman Empire British Empire  The USA  
Period  27 BC – 476 AD (Western) 1583-1914 1914-present 
Total duration 
of the Global 
Leadership 
(years) 
500 330 100 
GPTs 
 
Construction Revolution  
by Roads, Aqueducts, 
 Water Mills,  
etc. 
 
Industrial Revolution 
by Steam Engine  
(locomotive, steam-
boat, etc.) 
 
Telecommunications  
Revolution  
by Computer, Satellites, 
Internet, ICTs, etc. 
Figure 7. Changes in the techno-economic paradigm and global leadership over time 
 
This inductive study based on historical and empirical analyses seems to validate the HPα 
(leadership-driven innovation) that the origins (and pervasive diffusion) of GPTs and radical 
technologies are associated with the posture of critical societies to achieve/sustain the global 
leadership during international conflicts, which generate main processes of social disequilib-
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rium. In particular, purposeful country-systems  tend to generate GPTs mainly in strategic 
communications and energy systems (and parallel transportation technology) for achieving 
and sustaining the global leadership. These GPTs are spread in the long run across wide geo-
economic areas, generating a social and economic change that supports the evolution of socie-
ties. The pivot of global leadership within the observed linkages of the sources of new techno-
economic paradigms can explain the process that supports the human development. 
Ruttan (2006, p. 186) argues a main question:  
Will it take a major war or threat of war to induce the mobilisation of the scientific, technical, 
and financial resources necessary to develop major new general-purpose technologies?  
He, considering historical experience, answers: “it may”.  In fact, according to Ruttan (2001; 
2006) a major war, or threat of a major war, may be necessary to induce U.S. political and 
economic institutions (or some other great powers) to commit the huge resources necessary to 
generate or sustain the development of new GPTs. But, underlying this correct reasoning, the 
main driver is de facto the posture of US to sustain the global leadership, rather than engaging 
military conflicts (that are only a means to support the strategic objective of leadership)!  
As a matter4 of fact, international conflicts (and global wars in particular) tend to influence 
positively or negatively some economic processes in a permanent manner. However, this 
study shows that an international conflicts (and global wars) it is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition at the origin and diffusion of new techno-economic paradigms. In particular, the 
sources of General-Purpose Technologies seem to be purposeful country-systems  with high 
economic war potential and the objective of global leadership; 
 these purposeful systems , to cope with consequential environmental threats of other great 
powers, tend to generate and implement -by a process of learning and adaptation- several in-
ventions, innovations and GPTs to achieve/sustain the global leadership;  
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moreover, global leaders spread in the long-run these path-breaking technologies by eco-
nomic and political mechanisms across wide geo-economic areas.  
Hence, the origin and development of GPTs and new techno-economic paradigms seem to be 
associated with the posture of great powers to achieve/sustain the global leadership by strate-
gic R&D applied to win international conflicts. International conflicts (military and not / ef-
fective or potential) are very strong competitions for the world hegemony and leadership. 
Main mechanisms of contestable technology are present within these contexts and leading 
players endeavor to be the firsts in finding a solution of “selected” strategic and technologi-
cal problems by “selected” technologies for supporting a strategic advantage functional to 
achieve and sustain a global leadership9. In particular, during international conflicts, a vital 
goal of purposeful country-systems  is to support the development of strategic and contest-
able path-breaking technologies, which can:  
a) reinforce the economic war potential;  
b) assure strategic advantages in communications and energy systems;  
c) sustain the high reputation of great power, increasing the international prestige;  
d) ensure credible threats and/or commitment by high technological weapons. As a matter of 
fact, the technological supremacy generates a main deterrent signalling to discourage some 
threats of belligerent countries and sustain the incumbent global;  
e) generate, in the post war, an economic reward by the commercial technological develop-
ment of military technology that supports economic growth performances.   
Hence, the sources of GPTs can be induced by the posture of great powers to achieve and sus-
tain the global leadership in the presence of international conflicts, when high military inter-
ests and overriding needs of solving strategic problems support development of new path-
breaking technology. In some specific circumstances, in the presence of a threat and/or a 
world intensive competition in strategic fields of the “Big Science” (e.g. exploration of the 
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moon and Space), leader countries support radical innovations to reinforce economic war po-
tential, accumulation of capabilities and reputation of global leadership against other Great 
Powers. At a later stage, mainly in stable economic systems, spillovers for commercial tech-
nology development are triggered by global leaders, which spread new technology with a 
network-oriented approach and trade across wide geo-economic areas.  
For instance, radar technology is developed during the World War II by several nations inde-
pendently and in great secrecy for military objectives and spread for commercial use in the 
peacetime mainly by global leaders. A main role in this process of development and diffusion 
of commercial technologies, based on a “creative” substitution from old to new technology, 
is played by public sector. Ruttan (2006; 2006a; 2006b) demonstrates as military and defense-
related R&D and procurement (military demand) have supported a radical technological de-
velopment across a broad spectrum of industries in the U.S. such as in aircraft, computer, 
semiconductor and space industry (cf. Ruttan, 2006; Mowery, 2010). Kira and Mowery 
(2007) also argue that the development and diffusion of new technology in the USA are due 
to procurement activity rather than R&D. In fact, initial military demand and procurement are 
important mechanisms to support emerging technologies by a reduction of technological 
learning curves (cf. Ruttan, 2006; 2006a). Public support for non-military technology devel-
opment is an important source of radical innovations but successful research programs tend to 
generate evolutionary rather than revolutionary groundbreaking results such as in molecular 
biology and biotechnology (Ruttan, 2001; 2006; see also Coccia, 2014c, d, e). Some scholars 
argue that the transition from a military to a commercial jet aircraft likely could be slower in 
absence of high military R&D performed during World War II and military procurement dur-
ing the Korean War (cf. Ruttan, 2006; Mowery, 2010, p. 1245-1246).  
According to Ruttan (2006, p. 177) private sector alone cannot be a source of new general-
purpose technologies. In general, private firms can generate main radical innovations, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
9 The world “selected” is affected by influential definition of technological paradigm by Dosi (1982, p. 152).  
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whereas GPTs, which represent the long-run platform for clusters of radical innovations, tend 
to be generated mainly by countries to achieve/sustain the worldwide global leadership by 
strategic communications and energy systems (parallel to huge advances in transportation 
technology, cf. Coccia, 2005).  
In short, the international conflict (competition) is not the cause of GPTs but the context in 
which leading countries engender GPTs to cope with environmental threats and to take advan-
tage of important opportunities to achieve the global geo-political leadership.  
As a matter of fact, GPTs may not rise without a global leader, with a high military potential, 
that supports the posture to the global leadership10.  
Ruttan (2006; 2006a;2006b) does not believe that military R&D can again be a source of ma-
jor new GPTs due to structural change of the US economy and the shift of military objectives 
towards short-term tactical missions. In addition, the threat of system-level war seems to be 
ended with the Cold war that has reduced the incentives and overriding needs to invest in ma-
jor military and defense-related research projects. The observation by Ruttan (2006) is correct 
but is based on a scientific stance of stable economies in peacetime; in the presence of warfare 
shocks and/or strong turbulence of international crises, the environment and mechanisms of 
social systems can radically change creating fruitful scientific and technological factors to 
support the origins of GPTs governed by global leaders and economic change. This is the ar-
gument of next section.   
Human development and long-run evolution of societies by new techno-economic para-
digms governed by global leaderships: a sociological explanation 
Wars and global leadership are phenomena of societies that generate sociological problems 
and main structural changes (social, technological and economic change). A holistic analysis 
                                                                    
10 In order to have a better understanding of this scientific issue, other main studies are by: Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014), Alic et al. 
(1992), Ayres (1990, 1990a), Berry and Kim (1994), Boot (2006),  Coccia M. (2009a, 2010a, 2010b, 2011), Coyne and Mathers (2011), 
Evangelista (1988), Garden (1989), Ghosh (1943), Goldman and Eliason (2003), Hardie et al. (2011), Horowitz (2010), Jackson and 
Morelli (2011), Kamen (1968), Kramer et al. (2009), Lane (1958), Levy (2011), Libicki et al. (2011), Mahnken (2008), Murray and Millett 
(1996), Natu (1944), Poast (2006), Ransom (2006), Reppy (1998), Rosenzweig (2013), Ruttan (2006), Voigtländer and Voth (2013), 
Volland (1987), Von Hippel (1988), Walt (1996) and Wolfson (1998).  
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is important to understand the critical scientific nexus global leadership-sources of GPTs-
human development.  
The philosophy studies the war to explain its meaning and role for the human development. 
“War generally impedes [temporarily] economic development and undermines prosperity . . . 
.War is not without economic benefits, however” (Goldstein, 2003, p. 215; cf. also Goldstein, 
1988). Although war has several negative effects, it seems to have a main permanent connec-
tion with the progress of societies. War appears to be a necessary phase for human develop-
ment, which is not monotonous and straight but rather a process of disequilibrium (cf. Bobbio, 
1965). Stein and Russett (1980) argue that the war is the engine that propels economic change 
and supports the civilisation of societies. It seems that critical technological advances for hu-
man civilisation and human development are not originated in peaceful and evolutionary 
processes. Vital changes in the techno-economic paradigm are caused by processes of disequi-
librium governed by global leaders that generate a revolutionary phase of technological and 
economic change in social systems. In particular, social shocks start with international con-
flicts but they are the ending of an evolutionary process of social systems that causes a phase 
of disequilibrium in the state of the system. The long-run effects of these dynamics are social, 
technological and economic changes that support the evolution of societies and human devel-
opment (cf. Gini, 1920).  
In general, international conflicts and competition of “Big Science” for global leadership 
stimulate the inventive and innovative capability of societies and seem to be, so far, the main 
condition in which societies create new techno-economic paradigms. In the warfare, when 
survival of societies is in the running, human mind stretches towards the max concentration 
and labour to find apt means and priority resources to cope with consequential environmental 
threats and to achieve the vital objective of the victory (cf. von Humboldt, 1961). Under the 
incentive of the need and in the presence of overriding strategic problems, such as during a 
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war or international conflict, the innovative and creative spirit is intensified. The societies, 
under concentration and incentive of warfare, endeavor to gain the upper hand and to exploit, 
particularly, the newest and less known discoveries and inventions of science and technology 
(cf. Gini, 1920). Social and natural sciences and engineering tend to provide in the presence of 
warfare mainly new contributions based on current and new knowledge to support strategic 
objectives. In fact, during international conflicts, government interventions in the economic 
system are necessary in order to have the most effective condition of available human and ma-
terial resources and obtain the maximum return from socio-economic efforts to cope with bel-
ligerent nations. In particular, under concentration of the war, current communications and 
energy systems improve and new ones are generated to support priority military purposes 
(Gini, 1920). In general, war is prone to improve all types of communications and parallel 
transportations that have to generate the max performance because they assume a strategic 
importance (Mendershausen, 1943).  
Some societies with high economic war potential during international conflicts, can take ad-
vantage of important opportunities for achieving/sustaining the global leadership. As a matter 
of fact, global leaders endeavor to support invention and technological innovation of new in-
struments able to increase their efficiency of available resources and communications (lines). 
Hence, the critical technological progress of societies seems to be associated with main socio-
economic shocks, such as international conflicts, governed by leading countries, which gener-
ate disequilibrium processes with long-run effects of social and economic change (cf. 
Spencer, 1904; 1915).  
Moreover, socio-economic systems under concentration of warfare, in the presence of over-
riding strategic problems, tend to overcome resistances and barriers of individuals and/or 
groups, supporting technological and social advancements to cope with consequential envi-
ronmental threats; the impetus of this technological and social change is amplified in peace-
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time, when economies work with a normal rhythm (cf. Gini, 1920). The weaker nations also 
tend to have vital technological advances, which are difficult to achieve in normal period. The 
international conflicts spur several societies to be closer to the technological superiority of 
belligerent countries to cope with threats of turbulent environment. For instance, during Na-
poleonic wars, in order to increase the food requirement of French population, it was applied 
the technique of crop rotation (a main agricultural innovation), whereas during World War I 
and II, the need of economise fuel has supported, in some European countries, the electrifica-
tion of railway that was a difficult investment in previous pre-war period (Gini, 1920); in the 
US, the lack of labour during wartime, due to enrolment, has supported the diffusion of agri-
cultural mechanisation with fruitful benefits for American economic system in peacetime.  
Global technological and economic landscape of current societies would be vastly different in 
the absence of military and defense-related investment that tends to induce commercial tech-
nology development. In addition, patterns of new technology would have been substantially 
delayed without the stimulus of international conflicts based on concentration, incentives, 
military R&D and defense procurement. In fact, needs and strategic problems during warfare 
are strong incentive for generating new technology of communications, which in peacetime 
enhances the long-run circulation and cross fertilisation of ideas, supporting social, techno-
logical and economic change (cf. Bobbio, 1965, passim). Several main inventions and path-
breaking technological innovations (e.g. GPTs) have origins for military purposes governed 
by leader countries, as described, and in peacetime they tend to be transferred in commercial 
technology with a pervasive diffusion across geo-economic areas. This process of leadership-
driven innovation affects social change and patterns of economic growth of winners and los-
ers11.  
                                                                    
11 Economic literature shows that the economic growth of World War II winners experienced only marginal im-
pact, whereas losers experienced intense losses in the short run, but they were able to regain the positions an-
ticipated by pre-war rates of growth. Organski and Kugler (1980, pp. 106-107) claim this phenomenon as 
phoenix factor: “after their defeat (and the plummeting of their capabilities) loses accelerate their recovery”. 
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During the war a vital characteristic, alike in the biological evolution, is the adaptability of 
social organisations to stressful conditions by fruitful learning processes. Even the strongest 
economic war potential does not assure victory if the nation’s capacity does not quick adapt to 
new conditions. In particular, main mechanisms of learning and adaptation of great powers in 
turbulent environments are important to support new innovations for copying with consequen-
tial environmental threats and/or taking advantages of beneficial opportunities (cf. Mender-
shausen, 1943). Moreover, warfare can determine also a process of social selection: a social 
survival of the “fittest” social systems in turbulent environment (Stein and Russett, 1980, p. 
410). This social selection of the war supports the progress of virtuous and stable organisa-
tions (nations). In fact, Great Powers and leader countries, during wars, tend to reinforce their 
social organisation to progress towards advanced and increasingly efficient socio-economic 
systems.  
A main question is: why, during peacetime with normal rhythm of the economy or relaxed 
economic activity, do economic systems not tend to support new techno-economic paradigms?  
A sociological explanation is that the wellbeing of nations during peacetime is prone to in-
duce indolence, inertia, tranquillity and profligate behaviour of people. Nations, in the pres-
ence of low environmental threats are without strong incentives and strategic purposes to im-
prove institutions and institutional arrangements. The relaxed national psychology of coun-
tries in stable environment tends to weaken the innovative and creative spirit and, as a conse-
quence, the incentive to generate and new techno-economic paradigms: in fact, social systems 
have not any urgent and primary needs to satisfy and strategic problems to solve. Some na-
tions, during peacetime with higher wellbeing, lose several virtues concerning the personality 
of people, due to the exacerbation of above bad habits that in the long run may reduce the 
wealth. Virtuous posture of nations that spurs radical innovations and GPTs seems to be 
originated in the presence of stressful conditions such as in (effective or potential) interna-
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tional conflicts. The spirit of privation, the fruitful energy and initiative, the high speed and 
other talents are the luck of nations during wartime and peacetime. War and environmental 
threats seem to reinforce the social organisation and strategic behaviour of both stronger and 
weaker societies. Ruttan (2006, p. 184) argues that without a threat of major war, it is difficult 
that the US political system could be induced to mobilise the priority huge scientific, techni-
cal and financial resources to support the development of major military and strategic radical 
innovations that subsequently can be translated in commercial GPTs for progress of societies 
(as done in the past). These conditions at the origin of GPTs flourish in the presence of inter-
national conflicts and crises, driven by common institutional, entrepreneurial and scientific 
energies, to cope with consequential environmental threats and to achieve/sustain the global 
leadership.  
This inductive study shows some historical regularities, also underpinned in an empirical evi-
dence, concerning common characteristics driving new techno-economic paradigms in the 
history of technology. In particular, the determinants for supporting GPTs seem to be (see fig. 
8): 
 A country has a strong economic war potential, based on high R&D investments, and 
the objective to achieve a global leadership 
 It engages (effective or potential) international conflicts (competitions) against great 
powers (leading players)  
 It implements, under concentration and incentive of international conflicts, main radi-
cal technologies to solve overriding strategic problems in order to achieve/sustain the 
global leadership. 
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Figure 8. Sources of new techno-economic paradigms by global leader in international con-
flicts 
 
The war is necessary but not sufficient factor to generate GPTs. In particular, GPTs tend to be 
originated by the global posture of purposeful systems  (e.g. great power) to achieve/sustain 
the strategic purpose of global leadership in (effective or potential) international conflicts 
against leading players. Hence, the other (sufficient) conditions at the origins of GPTs seem to 
be the strategic objective of global leadership by a great power that induces the implementa-
tion of new technology to win a strong international competition against leading players 
(competitors), rather than warfare per se. this main nexus generates the leadership-driven in-
novation.  
In fact, some GPTs are not generated by warfare but by global posture of countries to sustain 
a global leadership also in extra-military competitions: e. g. the strategic competi-
tions/challenges in “Big Science” (de Solla Price, 1963; cf. Bush, 1945) and in big technology 
between US and Russia to explore the Space have also generated some main radical innova-
tions. Hence, although the international conflict (or global war) is the most important compe-
tition to achieve/sustain the global leadership and induce GPTs, there are also other intensive 
extra-military international competitions across leading players to support the global leader-
ship and spur the strong economic, scientific and technological potential of countries.  
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS  
Global Wars 
PEACETIME 
Great Power  supports the 
diffusion of GPTs on wide 
geo-economic areas  
Global Scientific 
Competitions in 
Big Science  
Great Power  origins 
the GPTs to win the 
competition and achieve 
the GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
Other leader 
countries   
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In short, the sources of GPTs have a main driving factor: a purposeful country  with the ob-
jective of global leadership in a strong international competition across leading players. 
These global leaders cause GPTs: new technology mainly in communications (such as train, 
ship, aircraft, satellites, internet, electricity, etc.) and energy systems that are the technical 
platform for supporting clusters of radical innovations, new technological paradigms  and 
human development (Coccia, 2005). In fact the evolution of some social systems requires new 
and specialised channels of communications and energy resources.  
The global leadership of great powers by these intensive competitions/conflicts can be a driv-
ing force of social, technical and economic change that supports the human development and 
civilisation. In particular, the posture to the global leadership of some countries affects origin, 
pace, direction and diffusion of vital technological change. The sources of GPTs are generated 
in social processes of disequilibrium governed by global leader that have economic-wide ef-
fects (fig. 8).  
In all, human society, although the unparalleled progress of knowledge and technology, it 
does not know the final destination of his history. The posture to posture to power of some 
societies can generate new international conflicts and social shocks for achieving the global 
leadership, causing unforeseeable directions of technological, social and economic change.  
Concluding Observations and Theoretical Implications 
One should always generalize 
Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi  
 
Global leadership of some societies can provide an adequate and better understanding of so-
cial and technological change across economic systems (see also Phillips, 2008; 2011). It may 
be stated that long-term evolution of societies and human development is a process of disequi-
librium governed by the dynamics and posture of purposeful country-systems to achieve 
global leadership in international conflicts that lays the foundations for changes in the techno-
economic paradigm. International conflicts, as the main social shocks driven by global lead-
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ers, have massive effects on individuals, groups, nations, societies and international systems. 
They are a major agent of social change (Stein and Russett, 1980, p. 400).  
This inductive study supports the hypothesis α (leadership-driven innovation) stated in the 
section methodology that the origins and pervasive diffusion of GPTs can be explained by the 
posture of leading countries, with high economic potential, which implement a grand strategy 
of radical innovations to achieve global leadership in the presence of international conflicts 
(competitions) against main players (great powers). The case study research and statistical 
analysis – considering the Roman, British and US global leadership – form a body of evi-
dence of historical regularities and common characteristics on the origins of GPTs governed 
by global leadership.  
Linstone (2003, p. 292) shows an interesting scenario: 
You are a forecaster in a superpower that is militarily and commercially dominant in the world. 
It is technologically superior, has an excellent engineering capability, a sound legal system, and 
a networked infrastructure to insure effective administration. Its tolerance creates a multicultural 
melting pot with a growing influx of people from less developed areas. It has a widening gap 
between rich and poor and a negative balance of trade. Its affluent shun military service and its 
imperial overstretch requires an enormous military budget. The result is an inevitable dissipa-
tion of its resources. No, I am not describing the United States but ancient Rome in the second 
century. 
 
This inductive study can pinpoint a set of connected and complementary socio-economic re-
sults concerning the sources of new techno-economic paradigms:  
 First. GPTs are associated with the posture of a purposeful country-system with a 
high economic potential and purposeful elements (e.g. coherent set of institutional 
arrangements) which have the common purpose to achieve and sustain a global 
geo-economic leadership over time.  
 Second. The sources of GPTs are underpinned in an environmental context repre-
sented by effective or potential international competitions (global warfare and/or 
worldwide scientific competitions of “Big Science”) among great powers seeking 
to achieve/sustain global leadership.  
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 Third. The strategy of Great Powers to achieve/sustain global leadership during 
international conflicts in turbulent environments is driven by high military R&D 
and procurement that spur GPTs.  
 Fourth. In order to cope with environmental threats in (effective or potential) in-
ternational conflicts/competitions, global leaders, while attempting to solve over-
riding strategic problems, generate discoveries, inventions and radical innovations 
that by a  process of learning and adaptation are implemented to secure a strate-
gic advantage against belligerent players.   
 Fifth. Global leaders tend to transfer in a stable environment the rich source of 
military technology into commercial technological innovations for a long-run per-
vasive diffusion on wide geo-economic areas. 
 Sixth. GPTs are difficult to nurture without the critical role of a leader society that 
invests heavily in high military R&D in order to achieve/sustain global leadership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. nexus global leadership-origins of GPTs- evolution of social systems  
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Hence, purposeful systems  with the aim of global leadership seem to be a major driving 
force of radical innovations, mainly during effective or potential international conflicts, be-
cause “the . . .  ‘necessity’ is the mother of invention” (Ayres, 1998, p. 289, original empha-
sis). In fact, in the presence of international conflicts, leading countries have environmental 
stimuli for solving problems in strategic fields that spur technical capability and technological 
innovations in order to cope with consequential environmental threats and/or to take advan-
tage and exploit beneficial opportunities.  
Moreover, the posture to the global leadership of purposeful country-systems  tends to shape 
cultural traits of people and institutions to sustain this position in competitive settings over 
time (cf. Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). In particular, the posture of global leadership is 
transmitted within the social system of leading countries across generations over the long run 
by institutions, which serve as social memory (cf. Walker et al., 2006). In fact, the social 
memory of institutions plays a vital role for transforming experience, knowledge and cultural 
traits of people into adaptive strategies and learning processes to respond, by technical capa-
bility and innovations, to adverse consequences in turbulent environment (cf. Di Giano and 
Racelis, 2012, p. 153). These concomitant characteristics of sustaining global leadership 
shape de facto the posture of leader countries to support continuously fruitful patterns of tech-
nological innovation and higher technological performances over time (cf. Coccia, 2010, pp. 
260-261; Ruttan, 2006; see Steil et al., 2002). This theoretical framework can be generalised 
(see Appendix A).  
An economic boundary of the global leader can be the high military expenditures to cope with 
effective (and potential) international conflicts that are prone to increase public debt, socio-
economic problems and economic shocks (cf. Ferguson, 2003; 2010).  
In fact, Kennedy (1987, pp. 539-540) argues: 
To be a great power—by definition, as a state capable of holding its own against any other na-
tion—demands a flourishing economic base. . .Yet by going to war, or by devoting a large share of 
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the nation’s ‘‘manufacturing power’’ to expenditures upon ‘‘unproductive’’ armaments, one runs 
the risk of eroding the national economic base. . . . maintaining at growing cost the military obliga-
tions they had assumed in a previous period. 
 
Moreover, vital military technology generated by great powers to achieve global leadership 
tends, as said, to be spread in peacetime across wide geo-economic areas but may also induce, 
according to Linstone (2003, p. 288), the: “formation of crazy states or multi-actors. Nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons are only one source of concern”.  
The global leader with technological supremacy may assume a worldwide role of superpower 
close to autocracy in order to sustain long-run leadership: this global posture may support a 
behaviour prone to permanent “wartime” (Linstone, 2007, p. 237). Anyhow, a purposeful 
country-system  can spur vital technological change acting as global leaders and referee 
worldwide to avoid discord and war across countries, and to respond in the presence of threats 
by aggressive and irresponsible states or non-state actors (such as Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), Al-Qāʿida, etc., cf. Dror, 2001, p.87ff). The U.S. tends to assume this role of 
global leader and referee, cf. Linstone, 2007, p. 235). Davis et al. (2012, p. 8) argue that: “The 
United States has an interest in dissuading military competition wherever it might arise. . . . 
U.S. forward military presence displaying U.S. conventional superiority” (cf. Posen, 2003; 
The White House, 2010; U.S. Department of Defence, 2012). In fact, a purposeful country-
system  with global leadership, underpinned in a technological supremacy and strong eco-
nomic war potential, can confront: “countries, groups, or individuals with aggressive goals, 
intense commitment, rational or irrational selection of tools and strategies, preference for high 
risks, and unconventional tactics” (Linstone, 2007, p. 234; cf. Linstone, 2007a; 2003).  
In all, the evolution of social systems tends to be driven by global leadership countries that 
support technological change and breakthroughs (fig. 9). This nexus between technological 
change and human evolution is a multidimensional and complex socio-economic process be-
cause the interrelationships among global leadership, warfare, new techno-economic para-
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digms and human development are intertwined with a causality that runs in several directions 
(cf. Goldstein, 2003). 
The results of this study have sought to provide a verisimilitude or degree of closeness to true 
socio-economic facts. In general, the origins of new techno-economic paradigms seem to be 
associated with strategic behaviour and other concomitant forces of great powers to achieve 
and sustain global leadership during effective (or potential) international conflicts. Neverthe-
less, the conclusions of this study are, of course, tentative because current societies are in-
creasingly complex and interconnected systems, and it might prove difficult to identify causes 
and effects of several relations. In addition, socio-economic analyses, including this study, are 
problematic when we know that other things are often not equal, such that no results will be 
true in all situations. Wright (1997, p. 1562) properly claims: “In the world of technological 
change, bounded rationality is the rule”.  
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Appendix A: Generalisation of the leadership-driven innovation hypothesis  
The theoretical implications of this study are that a purposeful system to achieve/sustain the 
global leadership in competitive settings to cope with consequential environmental threats 
and/or to take advantage of beneficial opportunities has a strong incentive to support path-
breaking innovations inducing long-run structural change (social, technological and economic 
change). This theoretical framework can explain the drivers, conditions and incentive mecha-
nisms to innovate of several economic subjects in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-based 
competition. At national level, in the nineteenth century, the purpose of Imperialist policy and 
global leadership by UK is driven by prevailing theories of mercantilism to create trade mo-
nopolies (e. g. restricting colonial trade exclusively to British ships and making England the 
sole market for important colonial products) to support exports, high profits and British 
wealth.   
From macro to microeconomics standpoint, mutatis mutandis, the HP of leadership-driven 
innovation can be applied to firms: sources of radical technologies are purposeful systems 
(e.g. firms) with high market potential, based on a strategy of high R&D expenditures and the 
objective of market leadership. The leading firms, to win international market competitions 
against other great business players, have a strong incentive to generate several discoveries 
and radical innovations that are spread by market mechanisms across wide geo-economic ar-
eas over time. This behaviour of leading firms generates a “destructive creation… destruction 
rather than creation in driving innovative activity” (Calvano, 2007, passim). The posture of 
firms to achieve and sustain the leadership, investing in R&D, is driven by the prospect of 
monopoly profits. Moreover, the posture to the leadership of purposeful systems (leading 
firms) tends to shape specific routines that by a process of adaptation and learning are trans-
mitted at organisational level (organisational learning) to sustain a leading organisational be-
haviour in competitive markets over time (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
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Moreover, this theoretical framework can support a fruitful explanation of changes in industry 
leadership as analysed by Lee and Malerba (2014). Hence, a purposeful firm-system of a 
country with economic potential to achieve the global market leadership has a strong incen-
tive to implement strategic radical innovations that induce industrial and corporate change.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1A. Linkages running from leadership to technological, industrial and corporate 
change 
 
The hypothesis of leadership-driven innovation based on purposeful systems with purposeful 
elements which have the purpose of leadership induces path-breaking innovations and support 
long-run structural, industrial and corporate change. It is a conceptual framework that seems 
to explain several dynamics of current Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition 
(Fig. 1A).   
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